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Book Reviews: International Relations 
others, trade is dominated by long-term con- 
tracts so that there is no single price structure 
to guide stabilization schemes; and in yet other 
cases products are sensitive to price competi- 
tion from synthetics or are produced in many 
grades that are difficult to classify and regu- 
late. Whatever the specific reason, price stabil- 
ization schemes often confront economic 
obstacles that reinforce the political obstacles 
discussed above. 
All of these factors and many more are ad- 
dressed in Finlayson and Zacher's analysis, 
which makes a valuable contribution both to 
the literature on North-South commodity bar- 
gaining and to the broader theoretical litera- 
ture of the field of international political econ- 
omy. Either contribution would have been 
welcome, but the authors' success in linking 
the two makes Managing International 
Markets an especially impressive achievement. 
VINCENT A. MAHLER 
Loyola University, Chicago 
NATO's Conventional Defenses. By Stephen J. 
Flanagan. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988. 
172p. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper. 
The Politics of European Defense Cooperation: 
Germany, France, Britain, and America. By 
David Garnham. Cambridge, MA: Bal- 
linger, 1988. 224p. $29.95. 
After forty-five years the invasion of West 
Germany from the East has finally begun. But 
contrary to the fears of Western defense ana- 
lysts, it is an invasion of cars and pedestrians, 
not of tanks, that is joyously breaching the 
Berlin Wall. Unfortunately, NATO's fortieth 
anniversary came too soon, stimulating a raft 
of scholarship that may now need to be re- 
worked in the light of momentous recent 
events in Eastern Europe. 
Works by Flanagan and Garnham respond 
to the question, How can Europe be defended 
in the coming era of declining U.S. hegemony 
and of European reluctance to employ nuclear 
weapons to fight wars? The authors respond in 
different ways. Garnham focuses on European 
defense cooperation as a way of enhancing the 
role European powers can play in their own 
defense, particularly in the management of 
nuclear risks. Flanagan explores the question 
much more broadly, examining the prospects 
for evolving a consensus on more effective 
strategies and tactics, on reforms in European 
conventional defense, and on cooperation. But 
the uniqueness of this book is his attention to 
technology, particularly to nonnuclear emerg- 
ing technologies, as a means of maintaining an 
acceptable balance and of increasing stability 
in times of crisis. 
Both works are thoughtful, clearly written, 
and rich in their scholarship. Both illuminate 
key areas of basic knowledge well. Flanagan 
shines in his discussion of strategy, notably of 
different conceptions of "deep strike" strategies 
including Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) and 
in his brief overview of the technologies that 
might support them. Garnham presents an ex- 
cellent succinct discussion of bilateral defense 
policy relations between the principal actors 
(the United States, Britain, France, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany) and offers a use- 
ful introduction to the possibilities and limita- 
tions of multilateral defense cooperation as 
well. Garnham's book, although it may be too 
basic for scholars, is a good candidate for 
assignment to advanced undergraduates or 
graduate students. Flanagan's work, as part of 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
series, is geared more to specialists and 
assumes knowledge that may stretch general 
readers (MLRS, for example, is never defined). 
Events subsequent to the writing of these 
works-the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty, changes in Soviet military 
doctrine, and the startling developments in 
Eastern Europe-have shifted the ground con- 
siderably since these projects were undertaken. 
In terms of these works the developments are 
fortuitous, for neither author has produced a 
convincing answer to the basic question of 
how a viable defense of Europe can be 
achieved in the politicostrategic climate they 
describe. Garnham demonstrates that Euro- 
pean Defense Cooperation has been growing 
but that cooperation also contains irreconcil- 
able problems. These problems are traced to 
national preferences to limit coproduction for 
national economic reasons that include the 
development of national technological compe- 
tence. They are also rooted in the fact that 
faced with any real risk of war with the Soviet 
Union, the Federal Republic, and Britain prefer 
to link their fate to the United States rather 
than to each other and to France. Yet Garnham 
concludes his book with the recommendation 
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that Europeans take on more of the role of the 
nuclear guarantor and that the United States 
retain a significant role in supporting conven- 
tional defense. Given political sensitivities in 
Germany about the use of nuclear weapons for 
any purpose other than deterrence, this re- 
alignment of alliance tasks seems highly 
unlikely. In fact, it may only prove feasible in 
a context of a greatly reduced assessment of 
the Soviet threat; for as Treverton has wisely 
pointed out in a recent Council on Foreign 
Relations book, Western Approaches to the 
Soviet Union (1988), at very low levels of risk 
one becomes less finicky about the ensure. In 
this evolving context West Germany might 
even be willing to bet its fate on a "European 
pillar" dependent largely on a French nuclear 
guarantee. In this new context Garnham may 
be correct to dispel the fear of German "Fin- 
landization" or "equidistancing" that the 
French and U.S. observers associate with im- 
proved inter-German relations. Given the ex- 
treme political weakness and prospect for 
chaos in the East, Germany would have little 
difficulty deciding to stay "anchored" in the 
West. 
Flanagan's argument is more cautious and 
nuanced. After reviewing NATOCs forward 
defense strategies and arguing that emerging 
technologies to enhance firepower countering 
numerically superior forces could be very help- 
ful, he leads us to understand that for largely 
technical reasons these very technologies offer 
little prospect of success in the near term. Flan- 
agan wisely incorporates political and eco- 
nomic considerations as well. Rejecting emerg- 
ing technologies as a "magic bullet," he con- 
cludes that NATO can only make incremental 
improvements in defense of its territory-and 
then only if Europeans believe that these 
changes will not increase their financial bur- 
den, increase the risk that deterrence will fail 
(as some perceive longer-range applications of 
FOFA may), and will not weaken the linkage 
to the U.S. nuclear guarantee. These are 
modest opportunities indeed. Fortunately, in 
the emerging context, even these modest gains 
may seem sufficient; and the fixation of the 
U.S. guarantee may decline as a criterion. 
While timing has ultimately helped both 
authors' arguments, it has also been unkind in 
two significant ways. Both books would have 
been better for being able to consider from 
some distance the defense policy implications 
of the INF agreement and the unfolding Con- 
ventional Forces Talks. Both suffer, as well, in 
their discussions of French defense policy, for 
not having had access to Richard Ullman's 
revelations (Foreign Policy [1989]) of 15 years 
of close Franco-American uclear cooperation. 
This must certainly alter how we understand 
the roles French conventional and nuclear 
forces would likely play in a European war. Er- 
rors in timing, however, are inevitable in this 
fast-moving and fascinating field. 
ROBERT B. CHARUCK 
Cleveland State University 
The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience 
of Relative Decline, 1895-1905. By Aaron 
L. Friedberg. Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, 1988. 329p. $29.95. 
Aaron Friedberg has written an important 
book on British imperial decline that indirectly 
illuminates a question of current public 
debate-the United States' experience of rela- 
tive decline. Those who are concerned either 
with the historical case or its present analogue 
will profit from the acuity with which Fried- 
berg poses his questions and the subtlety of his 
historical narrative. Not everyone, however, 
will be convinced that he has successfully chal- 
lenged the conventional wisdom that Britain 
reacted adeptly to the problems of imperial 
decline. 
This conventional view, as Friedberg accur- 
ately lays it out (pp. 292-95), is that Britain 
clearly understood its situation of relative 
economic and imperial decline around the turn 
of the century and rationally engaged in a 
triage of its excessive international commit- 
ments. Britain's astute strategy of appeasing 
most of its potential enemies, switching from 
"splendid isolation" to loose alliances to con- 
tain German power, helps explain "why the 
British empire lasted so long"-as Paul Ken- 
nedy has put it. By implication, Britain's suc- 
cessful strategic retrenchment is a model for a 
similar strategy on the part of the United 
States. 
Friedberg challenges this view, arguing that 
Britain understood the reality of its relative 
decline in only a halting and partial way. Due 
in part to this intellectual failure in measuring 
its power in the economic and military 
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